This paper analyzes the exchange rate in a "no-arbitrage" or "real business cycle" equilibrium model and provides empirical evidence for this model vis-a-vis PPP. Our contribution is to show, based on a generalization of the equilibrium model of exchange rates, that (i) the test equation linking the exchange rate to fundamentals should allow for international heterogeneity in time preferences or risk attitudes, as well as noise-that is, the model should not be tested as an exact relation; (ii) empirical work should use levels of variables rather than first differences; (iii) tests on the existence of long-run relations should be complemented by tests on the signs of the coefficients; (iv) the specification of the regression should offer demonstrated advantages over alternatives, and the significance tests should not rely on asymptotic distributions; and (v) the tests should steer clear of countries that have imposed, for most of the period, capital restrictions or exchange controls, thus violating the integrated-markets assumption of the model. Our empirical work shows that, as a long-run relation, the generalized model outperforms PPP.
Introduction
A recent class of exchange rate models (called by a variety of names such as "equilibrium", "no-arbitrage", and "real business cycle" models) relates the real exchange rate to real consumption, time preference, and relative risk aversion (or intertemporal substitution).
Our main objective, in this paper is to extend the existing models, and add fresh empirical evidence to extant tests of this model. This introductory section provides a brief review of the theoretical foundations and available empirical results.
The cornerstone of the equilibrium approach to exchange rates is the result that, under suitable assumptions, the real exchange rate is the ratio of the marginal utilities of real spending. 1 For instance, Stockman (1980) and Lucas (1982) study the exchange rate in a model of an endowment economy with frictionless markets, where the solution is of an "equilibrium" nature in the sense that it maximizes international aggregate utility. Dumas (1992) applies this equilibrium property of the exchange rate in his analysis of a one-good production economy where international trade in goods is costly 2 and where agents have constant and identical risk aversions and time preferences. Sercu, Uppal, and Van Hulle (1995) study an endowment-economy with shipping costs and obtain closed-form solutions rather than the numerical results of Dumas. Instead of using shipping costs to model countries as distinct economic entities, Backus and Smith (1993) derive the exchange-rate in a model with one perfectly tradable good and one non-tradable good and CES consumption preferences defined over these two goods.
Other utility-maximizing models often do not refer to this literature, but nevertheless fit into the "equilibrium" category- Stulz (1987) , for example, considers a two-country production economy with log investors who have a identical Cobb-Douglas preferences defined over a perfectly tradable good and a non-traded good. The equilibrium model also nests the monetary economies considered in Bakshi and Chen (1997) and Basak and Gallmeyer (1999) , where the focus is on determining the prices of financial securities rather than expressing the exchange rate in terms of observable variables and relating it to PPP. Bakshi 1 For a recent review of macroeconomic models of the exchange rate see Devereux (1997) , Lane (1999) , and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) . 2 Empirical support for the effects of shipment costs has been documented in Engel (1993) , Rogers and Jenkins (1995) , and Wei and Parsley (1995) , who find that a significant proportion of the total variation in the real exchange rate arises from deviations from the Law of One Price (LOP). Also, Engel and Rogers (1995) show that within-country deviations from LOP are much smaller than cross-country deviations.
and Chen assume log utilities, lognormal distributions, and perfect commodity markets where money is neutral, while Basak and Gallmeyer characterize the exchange rate in an exchange economy with money in the utility function. In all these models, market failures are absent, so that the solution corresponds to (and is often explicitly based on) the central-planners solution. Backus, Foresi and Telmer (1996) generalize the Stockman (1980) and Lucas (1982) models rather than specializing it. First, they link the nominal exchange rate to the marginal utility of nominal spending, an approach that neatly avoids the assumption, implicit in any real-exchange-rate model with more than one good, that utility is homothetic. Moreover, the Backus et al. result is established starting from the notion of no arbitrage in financial markets, where the key assumption is that asset markets are frictionless and complete; thus, the "equilibrium" model is robust to market failures in the real economy provided they do not invalidate the role of marginal utility as the pricing kernel. 3 Sercu and Uppal (2000) provide a general first-order decomposition of the change of the nominal exchange rate for a wide range of (state-independent) utility functions and economic settings; they also discuss the links of the equilibrium model with the PPP hypothesis. Our contribution on the theoretical front is to extend the Sercu and Uppal (2000) model to allow for state dependent utility functions, and more importantly, different rates of time-preference and risk aversion across countries and across time.
Turning now to empirical work, we first review test of the PPP hypothesis. Abuaf and Jorion (1990) use Dickey-Fuller tests to establish the presence of mean-reversion in real exchange rates, a phenomenon not evident from autocorrelations tests on first-differenced data; and Johansen and Juselius (1992) refine the cointegration techniques in an attempt to find long-run relations between exchange rates and relative price levels that may be hard to detect in first-differenced data. Edison, Gagnon, and Melick (1997) show how the power of these tests can be improved using the Horvath and Watson (1995) procedure. Expanded data sets have been considered by, for instance, Frankel and Rose (1996) , Froot, Kim and Rogoff (1995) , Lothian (1997) , Lothian and Taylor (1995) , Wei and Parsley (1995) , and Taylor (1995) . Related work includes Engel, Hendrickson and Rogers (1996) and O'Connell (1998) . A review of the empirical literature on PPP is provided by , 3 See Duffie (1992) for details on this approach to asset pricing. The pricing-kernel or martingale-pricing approach has also been used to study the relation between exchange rates and international interest rates by Nielsen and Saa-Requejo (1993) , Backus, Foresi and Telmer (1996) , and Hollifield and Uppal (1997) . Nessén (1994) and Rose (1996/7) .
We now review the empirical tests of the equilibrium model of exchange rates. Backus and Smith (1993) test (and reject) the hypothesis that the real exchange rate is an exact loglinear function of the real-consumption ratio, by comparing the means, standard deviations, and autocorrelations of changes in the two time series. Most tests, however, rely on regression analysis, either of differenced data or of levels. An example of the first type of regression is found in the first-pass tests by Koedijk Nissen, Schotman and Wolff (1996) , where they cross-sectionally relate changes in exchange rates to consumption growth rates and find no significant link. When subsequently studying panel data at the integrated level, Koedijk et al. find evidence broadly consistent with PPP but, again, no traces of any consumption effect. Other tests that analyze levels of the data are cointegration tests as provided by, for instance, Nessén (1994) and Sercu and Uppal (2000) . These tests typically find evidence in support of the existence of a long-term relation between nominal exchange rates and CPIs, but with a cointegration vector that is incompatible with PPP. In addition, in the analysis of quarterly data on five countries by Sercu and Uppal (2000) there appears to be a long-run link between the real exchange rate and real consumptions, which seems to favor the "equilibrium" model over PPP. However, cointegration tests by Kollmann (1995) on seven countries do not find evidence of such relations. 4 In Section 2, we start from these empirical studies to come up with a list of desiderata for our own work: (i) at the very least, the test equation should allow for international heterogeneity in time preferences or risk attitudes, as well as noise-that is, the model should not be tested as an exact relation; (ii) empirical work should use levels of variables rather than first differences; (iii) tests on the existence of long-run relations should be complemented by tests on the signs of the coefficients; (iv) the specification of the regression should offer demonstrated advantages over alternatives, and the significance tests should not rely on asymptotic distributions; and (v) the tests should steer clear of countries that have imposed, for most of the period, capital restrictions or exchange controls, thus violating the integrated-markets assumption of the model. Our empirical work shows that, as a longrun relation, the generalized model does outperform PPP and that, with one exception, the coefficients have the correct sign. Section 3 describes our data and test procedure. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. We conclude in Section 5.
The model and test design
This section presents the considerations motivating the design of our test of the RBC model of exchange rates. Let S(t) denote the nominal exchange rate (units of currency 1 per unit of currency 2). Backus et al. (1996) establish that, in an economy with representative consumers and perfect, arbitrage-free capital markets, the nominal exchange rate equals the ratio of the marginal utilities of nominal spending of country 2 and country 1. That is , if country k's marginal utility is denoted by m k (t), k = {1, 2}, then
Let C k (t) denote nominal consumption in country k at time t, η the measure of relative risk aversion of the representative investor, and Π k (t) the consumption price level in country k at time t. If utility is iso-elastic with exponent (1 − η), then the marginal utility of real consumption is (C(t)/Π(t)) −η , and the utility of nominal spending is obtained by dividing by Π(t). Rearranging, we obtain the model for the real rate that is tested by Backus and Smith (1992) and Kollmann (1995) :
Given that the above model links the real rate to the consumption ratio, it is sometimes called the real business cycle (RBC) model. Being more precise than the labels "equilibrium" and "no arbitrage," we adopt the RBC name in the remainder of the paper. Note that the prediction is that higher real consumption abroad lowers the real value of the foreign currency. For testing purposes, the standard RBC model is often written in terms of percentage changes or changes of logs, see for instance Backus and Smith (1992) or Kollmann (1995) :
To see how much generality has been lost in the standard RBC equations (2)- (3), we now consider a setting that is less restrictive than that considered in the existing literature.
In general, the marginal utility of nominal spending in country k at date t is an indirect one, derived from the (static) problem of a consumer who faces a vector of prices for the N goods, p k (t), and who wishes to allocate a budget of C k (t) over the consumption of these
where X k (t) is a vector of (possibly country-specific) state variables that affect utility. 5 This problem can be written as:
where
refers to the period-t indirect utility function of total spending, given prices, C k (t) denotes the nominal consumption budget, expressed in terms of country k's currency,
X k (t) denotes the vector of state variables that affect utility in country k, Thus, the marginal indirect utility of nominal spending in country k is the multiplier in the above optimization problem:
The change in marginal utility can therefore be decomposed into a (possibly varying) timepreference component, growth in real consumption weighted by (possibly varying) relative risk aversion, an inflation rate computed from marginal spending weights, and fluctuations due to state variables. The details of this decomposition, a generalization of a result in Sercu and Uppal (2000) , is provided in the appendix. It then follows from equation (1) that the first-order components of the change in the exchange rate are given by
differential RRA-weighted real consumption growth
effects of state variables
, the semi-elasticity of marginal utility with respect to time, that is, the measure of instantaneous time preference,
c kj p kj C k dp kj p kj , inflation weighted on the basis of total consumption, 7 and
, the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to X ks .
Thus, the standard RBC equations (2)- (3) assume that utility is homothetic as well as
) and ζ ks (t) = 0). In addition, investors are assumed to have equal time preferences δ k and constant and equal relative risk aversions η k . A first obvious implication is that, if the primary issue of interest 6 This definition of relative risk aversion, also adopted by Breeden (1978) , is a "real" measure of relative risk aversion because, when taking partial derivatives with respect to C k , we hold prices constant. In the one-good no-inflation case, this definition is identical to the standard definition,
When money is in the utility function, as in Stulz (1987) , the interest rate will be part of the price index, Π k .
is the validity of the general approach rather than a highly specialized version of it, then time preferences and risk aversions ought not be restricted to be equal across time, as done in Backus and Smith (1992) , Kollmann (1995) and Koedijk et al. (1996) . That is, the RCB model should be extended to allow for a trend as well as for differential sensitivity to the two cycles.
Second, consider the implications of ignoring the difference between marginal-versus average-weighted inflation. One effect is that this introduces an error-in-variables bias, (reinforcing a similar problem arising from having to use noisy aggregate consumption data).
But the deviation between the marginal and average inflation rates also implies that the relation between the exchange rate, consumption data, and CPIs is no longer exact even if risk aversions and time preferences were really constant and identical, and if the assumptions of complete markets, consensus probabilities and representative consumers were actually true. Other potential sources of inexactness that are assumed away in equation (2) are the variability in the cross-country time-preference differential and other state variables.
At best, these omitted variables add noise to the equation, but if they are correlated with the regressors then they also induce an omitted-variables bias in the estimates of δ and η.
While there are no obvious cures for the errors-in-variables and omitted-variables biases, the least one can do, in light of equation (5), is not just to extend the RBC model so as to allow for international heterogeneity in the δs and ηs, but also to allow for the presence of an error term. This error term in the constant-parameter regression will be autocorrelated if the risk-and time-attitude parameters change slowly over time. 9 Koedijk et al. (1996) complement their first-pass regressions on differenced data by a thorough analysis of integrated data, which offers more power provided that there is a longrun relation between the levels of the variables. Such cointegration tests are provided by, amongst others, Kollmann (1995) and Sercu and Uppal (2000) . While Kollmann finds no relation, Sercu and Uppal do. However, Sercu and Uppal do not establish whether the cointegration vector is consistent with PPP. In the same vein, a long-run relation between real exchange rate and real consumption data could still be incompatible with the RBC model if the real rate were negatively (positively) related to domestic (foreign) real consumption.
That is, while, the generalized RBC model does not give specific numerical values for the η coefficients, we do know that relative risk aversion should be positive. Thus, we complement the available cointegration tests by estimating the magnitude and testing the sign of the coefficients (obtained from integrated data).
The new issue that arises immediately is about the regression specification and significance level to use. Koedijk et al. chose a specification that corresponds to the standard VAR/ECM equation for first differences of S(t) except that also the contemporaneous inflation rates show up on the right hand side. They do not discuss any alternatives. A paper that does so, at great depth, is by Phillips and Loretan (1991) , that sets up exten- Having chosen the empirical test specification, the next step is to select the data series.
Both Backus and Smith (1993) and Koedijk et al. (1996) consider over twenty countries, while Kollmann (1995) considers seven. We choose five countries for the following reason.
Among the countries studied in the three above papers, about 80 percent of the countries restricted international financial flows at some point in time, and many did so until the early nineties. 10 These measures can be comparatively mild, like the two-tier exchange rates adopted in Belgium for over 45 years, in the UK during much of the eighties, and for a brief period also in Italy. Other measures have been more obstructive, like licenses or other restrictions (all Southern EU countries including France; also Ireland, Japan), or even 10 See IFS, various issues, for reviews of exchange restrictions and the like.
full bans on foreign portfolio investment (all Nordic countries, and most NICs and LDCs).
Especially the more drastic restrictions make a mockery of tests of a model that assumes perfectly integrated financial markets. Some of the countries with good records in this field have been tracking Germany too closely to provide much additional information, and/or have few world-class firms that effectively attract international investors. In the end, we decided to select the four large economies whose currencies dominate the foreign exchange market and whose securities dominate the world stock market: the USA; the UK, despite a dual exchange rate in the early eighties; Germany; and Japan, despite its exchange controls prior to 1982; and, Switzerland, a mainstream non-ERM economy with unrestricted capital flows.
In the next two sections, our objective is to evaluate the generalized RBC model, that is, the Backus-Smith equation extended so as to allow for noise as well as different timepreference and risk-aversion parameters across countries:
where ∆ is the difference of the time preference parameters, per quarter. The performance of the generalized RBC model is measured relative to is PPP (that is, where ∆ = η 1 = 0 = η 2 ), and we use data in levels rather than first differences. Our approach is similar to what has become standard in the empirical literature on PPP: rather than requiring that equation (7) hold exactly at any given date, we verify whether the variables identified in the model have an influence on the exchange rate in the long run. If we succeed in doing so, then PPP does not provide the best possible explanation of long-run exchange-rate behavior.
Data, estimation procedure, and significance tests
Our data are quarterly consumption spending series, CPI data in the last month of the quarter, and end-of-quarter exchange rate data from IFS for the United States (US), Japan (JP), Germany (DE), the United Kingdom (UK), and Switzerland (CH), over the period 1974:I to 1994:IV. We take the USD as the reference currency (corresponds to currency "1", in the theoretical model) and convert all exchange rates into USD per unit of foreign
currency. In what follows, the other country is generally referred to as country k = {DE, JP, US, CH}.
Our regression specification is based on equation (6). We found that no leads were necessary, and that two quarters amply sufficed at the lag side. Thus, defining ∆ l X(t) ≡
The first line in (8) is the model stated in levels, from equation (7). The second line captures the first-order autocorrelation, ρ, in the deviations from the long-run equilibrium. The third line adds lagged changes in the relevant variables to pick up any remaining predictability in the error.
To estimate (8) we use Seemingly Unrelated Nonlinear Least Squares, first in bilateral estimations (reported in Table 1 ) where no restrictions are imposed, and then in jointestimation (Table 2) where we restrict the value of β us (the estimator of η us ) to be the same across all the countries. Rather than relying on asymptotic normality, we evaluate the significance of the t-statistics by means of Monte-Carlo experiments. In all of the experiments, price and consumption variables are generated on the basis of estimated VARs, without an error-correction/cointegration term because Johansen-Juselius tests do not reveal any relation among the five price series nor among the five real-consumption series separately. Specifically, the five inflation rates and real-consumption growth rates are first estimated, and then simulated, as mutually correlated ARIMA processes. The simulated exchange-rate data, in contrast, are produced by three alternative "null" data-generating processes, none of which allows a role for real consumption or a time trend. These three "null" data-generating processes are:
(i) ARIMA: the real exchange rates are assumed to be non-stationary, and follow mutually correlated ARIMA (2,1,0) processes (Roll, 1977) .
(ii) PPP: the real exchange-rate equation has, in addition to the VAR part, an errorcorrection term that links the exchange rate to its PPP value. Again, the innovations are correlated across exchange rates.
(iii) Generalized PPP: the procedure is the same as in the previous model, except that now the coefficients δ us and δ k in the error-correction term for the nominal exchange-rate
, are estimated rather than pre-set at unity. This is motivated by the finding of several studies of a cointegration relation between S(t), Π us (t) and Π k (t − 1)], with coefficients deviating from unity.
For each data-generating process we simulate 3000 complete 90-quarter, five-country samples (prices, consumptions, and exchange rates), and for each of these samples we estimate equation (8), either bilaterally (in Table 1 ) or with the constraint that β us , the estimator of η us , be identical across equations (in Table 2 ). We retrieve the t-statistics for each coefficient, rank them, extract simulated percentile values, and provide values for the 1 st , 5 th , 10 th , 90 th , 95 th , and 99 th percentiles in Tables 1 and 2 under the header "two-sided confidence interval for t-statistics". The pattern of rejections are similar across the three alternative "null" models. From, for example, Abuaf and Jorion (1991) we know that in a sample of a few decades of monthly data, mean-reversion is hard to detect. What our Monte-Carlo experiments indicate is in line with this: the part of exchange-rate changes picked up by the PPP error-correction model is too small to have a material impact on the structure of the simulated data. The same appears to hold when we allow a relation between S(t), Π us (t) and Π k (t − 1)] that is more general than PPP: the generalization seems to have only a marginal impact on the simulated numbers. Thus, irrespective of the details of the null, the generalized RBC model seems to outperform PPP.
Empirical results
The estimates in Table 1 does not restrict the relative risk-aversion coefficient for the US to be the same across equations. The χ 2 (3) statistic on this restriction is 7.429, which would be significant at the 6% level if the distribution were χ 2 indeed. However, simulations reveal that the distribution is substantially wider. 14 From these simulations, the 95% percentile χ 2 -test under the null turns out to be 53.84, which is much larger than the asymptotic value of 7.815 in well-behaved samples. Or, summarizing our results in a different way: when using 7.429 as the critical χ 2 value for the hypothesis that the data are generated by a model with equal US coefficient, we observe not 6% incorrect rejections, but 50%. In short, we cannot reject the hypothesis of a common coefficient for the US.
When this common β us is imposed across equations (in Table 2 ), the results do not change substantially. The average estimate of relative risk aversion across the five estimates is virtually unaffected (1.67). While the estimated coefficient for Japan's real consumption loses significance and the estimated coefficient for German real consumption remains significantly negative, the UK estimate changes sign and becomes positive, and three out of the 13 To avoid weighting the estimate for the US four times instead of only once, we first compute the average η us over the four separate estimates (which produces η us = 5.01) and we then compute an equally-weighted average of the five country estimates. This international average is close to the one in Table 2 , where η us is constrained to be equal across all regressions. A simple average, over all eight estimates, would have been 2.92 instead of 1.66.
14 Given that the null of the χ 2 -test is that the generalized RBC model holds with a US coefficient that is identical across equations, the simulated samples are now generated by a generalized RBC model that has as its parameters the estimates from Table 2 (that is, with a common value for η us ). From each of the 3000 artificial samples we then estimate the equation without restriction on the US coefficient and we compute a standard χ 2 -test for equality of these coefficients across the four equations.
four time-trend coefficients are now significant. In short, we still conclude that both the time-trend and risk-aversion have noticeable effects, and in all cases but one, the estimated risk-aversion parameter has the correct sign. Combined with the conclusions from earlier tests on the presence of cointegration relations, we find that long-run PPP does not provide the best explanation for the level of the exchange rate, and that even a very restrictive model like the RBC one is able to outperform PPP.
Conclusion
Much of the literature on exchange rate determination is based on PPP, with PPP being justified on the basis of the consumption opportunity set (frictionless commodity arbitrage).
In contrast, the standard micro-economic equilibrium paradigm views relative prices-and, hence, also exchange rates-as determined not just by consumption opportunity sets, but also by marginal utilities. We use regression analysis to test the RBC exchange rate model assuming homothetic, state-independent power utility with constant time-preference parameters; we use levels, an efficient estimation criteria, and Monte-carlo-based significance levels. We find that our model outperforms PPP; that is, real spending and international differences in time preferences appear to have an influence on the real exchange rate.
Appendix: Decomposition of changes in marginal utility
In the derivation of the decomposition, below, we start from the total differential of marginal utility of nominal spending, 
Substitution of (A1) into (1) then gives (5). 
whose coefficients β L estimates relative risk aversion. According to the model, 
Notes for Table 2
The table reports results from estimating equation (8) using Seemingly Unrelated Nonlinear Least
Squares with the restriction that β us = η us (> 0) must be the same across all countries. The reference country is the US, the foreign countries (k) are Germany, UK, Japan, and Switzerland.
The log level of each real exchange rate, ln[S(t)Π k (t)/Π us (t)], is regressed on a constant, a time trend (whose coefficient, β 0 , estimates the difference in impatience), and the log of domestic and observed t-statistic is outside the interval-that is, the assumed data-generating process is rejected.
